相关论文: Social Choice Under Incomplete, Cyclic Preferences

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…

This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…

Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…

Two main procedures characterize the way in which social actors evaluate the qualities of the options in decision-making processes: they either seek to evaluate their intrinsic qualities (individual learners), or they rely on the opinion of…

We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…

There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…

Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policymaker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important…

We extend Berge's Maximum Theorem to allow for incomplete preferences. We first provide a simple version of the Maximum Theorem for convex feasible sets and a fixed preference. Then, we show that if, in addition to the traditional…

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair…

Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…

In several decision-making problems, alternatives should be ranked on the basis of paired comparisons between them. We present an axiomatic approach for the universal ranking problem with arbitrary preference intensities, incomplete and…

This paper provides a general characterization of preferences that admit a Richter-Peleg representation without imposing completeness or transitivity. We establish that a binary relation on a nonempty set admits a Richter-Peleg…

We consider a model of socially interacting individuals that make a binary choice in a context of positive additive endogenous externalities. It encompasses as particular cases several models from the sociology and economics literature. We…

We establish an equivalence between two seemingly different theories: one is the traditional axiomatisation of incomplete preferences on horse lotteries based on the mixture independence axiom; the other is the theory of desirable gambles…

Pairwise comparisons between alternatives are a well-established tool to decompose decision problems into smaller and more easily tractable sub-problems. However, due to our limited rationality, the subjective preferences expressed by…

When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…

To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…

In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…

We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the extension rule used to…