相关论文: Approximately Efficient Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining…

The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…

Budget feasible mechanism considers algorithmic mechanism design questions where there is a budget constraint on the total payment of the mechanism. An important question in the field is that under which valuation domains there exist budget…

We introduce a combinatorial variant of the cost sharing problem: several services can be provided to each player and each player values every combination of services differently. A publicly known cost function specifies the cost of…

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…

We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the problems we consider, a group of participants compete to…

We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…

We study revenue maximization in a buyer-seller setting where the seller has a single object and the buyer has both a private valuation and a private budget. Private budgets complicate the classic single-product monopoly problem, making…

We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to…

We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to…

Submodularity in combinatorial optimization has been a topic of many studies and various algorithmic techniques exploiting submodularity of a studied problem have been proposed. It is therefore natural to ask, in cases where the cost…

Submodular functions are an important class of functions in combinatorial optimization which satisfy the natural properties of decreasing marginal costs. The study of these functions has led to strong structural properties with applications…

We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these…

We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to…

In this paper, we investigate a class of submodular problems which in general are very hard. These include minimizing a submodular cost function under combinatorial constraints, which include cuts, matchings, paths, etc., optimizing a…

In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for…

The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are…

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget…

This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…