相关论文: Disordered Environments in Spatial Games

We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving…

As autonomous agents become more prevalent, understanding their collective behaviour in strategic interactions is crucial. This study investigates the emergent cooperative tendencies of systems of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in a…

Spatial games are crucial for understanding patterns of cooperation in nature (and to some extent society). They are known to be more sensitive to local symmetries than e.g. spin models. This paper concerns the evolution of the prisoner's…

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…

Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…

Social hierarchy is important that can not be ignored in human socioeconomic activities and in the animal world. Here we incorporate this factor into the evolutionary game to see what impact it could have on the cooperation outcome. The…

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…

We have studied an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with players located on two types of random regular graphs with a degree of 4. The analysis is focused on the effects of payoffs and noise (temperature) on the maintenance of…

The standard iterated prisoner's dilemma is an unrealistic model of social behaviour because it forces individuals to participate in the interaction. We analyse a model in which players have the option of ending their association. If the…

Dynamics of a social population is analyzed taking into account some physical constraints on individual behavior and decision making abilities. The model, based on Evolutionary Game Theory, predicts that a population has to pass through a…

Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest neighbor…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…

Gallice and Monzon (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack…

We use analytical techniques based on an expansion in the inverse system size to study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of finite populations of players interacting in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We show that a mechanism of…

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…

We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly cooperative…

Exploration of mechanisms underlying the emergence of collective cooperation remains a focal point in field of evolution of cooperation. Prevailing studies often neglect historical information, relying on the latest rewards as the primary…

The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…

Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…

In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of people's individuality. In order to investigate how diversity of agent's rationality affects the evolution of cooperation, we introduce the individual rationality…