相关论文: Characteristics Design: A Hedonic Approach to Opti…
In search engines, online marketplaces and other human-computer interfaces large collectives of individuals sequentially interact with numerous alternatives of varying quality. In these contexts, trial and error (exploration) is crucial for…
We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase efficiency and the associated distributional implications. To…
Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same…
Hierarchical random effect models are used for different purposes in clinical research and other areas. In general, the main focus is on population parameters related to the expected treatment effects or group differences among all units of…
Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face…
The share-of-choice (SOC) problem is a widely studied problem for product line design (PLD) where representative customers are sampled from a target population and the percentage of the ones who choose the offered products over outside…
I study the optimal allocation of positional goods in the presence of externalities arising from consumers' concerns about relative consumption. Applications include luxury goods, priority services, education, and organizational…
This paper characterizes differentiable and subgame Markov perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision problem with non-constant discounting. Capturing the idea of non commitment by letting the commitment period being…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
To choose between two discrete goods, a consumer pays attention to only those with prices below a threshold. From these, she chooses her most preferred good. We assume consumers in a population have the same preference but may have…
In this paper we introduce two models of opinion dynamics in oligopoly markets and apply them to a situation, where a new entrant challenges two incumbents of the same size. The models differ in the way the two forces influencing consumer…
We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers…
In clinical trials, the response of a given subject often depends on the selected treatment as well as on some covariates. We study optimal approximate designs of experiments in the models with treatment and covariate effects. We allow for…
This paper aims to investigate how a central authority (e.g. a government) can increase social welfare in a network of markets and firms. In these networks, modeled using a bipartite graph, firms compete with each other \textit{\`a la}…
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…
A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she announces a menu of products and prices, each agent $x$ will choose to buy that product $y(x)$ which maximizes his own utility, if positive. The…
Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study…
We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between…
The present work generalizes the analytical results of Petrikaite (2016) to a market where more than two firms interact. As a consequence, for a generic number of firms in the oligopoly model described by Janssen et al (2005), the…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…