相关论文: Fair Committee Selection under Ordinal Preferences…
In the $k$-committee election problem, we wish to aggregate the preferences of $n$ agents over a set of alternatives and select a committee of $k$ alternatives that minimizes the cost incurred by the agents. While we typically assume that…
We consider committee election of $k \geq 2$ (out of $m \geq k+1$) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance…
Motivated by recent work in computational social choice, we extend the metric distortion framework to clustering problems. Given a set of $n$ agents located in an underlying metric space, our goal is to partition them into $k$ clusters,…
Selecting representatives based on voters' preferences is a fundamental problem in social choice theory. While cardinal utility functions offer a detailed representation of preferences, ordinal rankings are often the only available…
We study the problem of selecting a representative committee of $k$ agents from a collection of $n$ agents in a common metric space. This problem is related to choosing $k$ facilities in facility location and $k$-median problems. However,…
In this work we consider general facility location and social choice problems, in which sets of agents $\mathcal{A}$ and facilities $\mathcal{F}$ are located in a metric space, and our goal is to assign agents to facilities (as well as…
We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the preferences of the agents and their groups, our goal is to…
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the…
In this work, we study the hardness of approximation of the fair $k$-center problem. In this problem, we are given a set of data points in a metric space that is partitioned into groups and the task is to choose a subset of $k$-data points,…
In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of $k$ candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a social cost, defined as a function of the distances between…
In this work, we define and solve the Fair Top-k Ranking problem, in which we want to determine a subset of k candidates from a large pool of n >> k candidates, maximizing utility (i.e., select the "best" candidates) subject to group…
We consider the matching problem in the metric distortion framework. There are $n$ agents and $n$ items occupying points in a shared metric space, and the goal is to design a matching mechanism that outputs a low-cost matching between the…
We study a discrete fair division problem where $n$ agents have additive valuation functions over a set of $m$ goods. We focus on the well-known $\alpha$-EFX fairness criterion, according to which the envy of an agent for another agent is…
In this paper, we study the problem of fair clustering on the $k-$center objective. In fair clustering, the input is $N$ points, each belonging to at least one of $l$ protected groups, e.g. male, female, Asian, Hispanic. The objective is to…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitarian social choice setting, where the agents have explicit…
We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…
Classical clustering problems such as \emph{Facility Location} and \emph{$k$-Median} aim to efficiently serve a set of clients from a subset of facilities -- minimizing the total cost of facility openings and client assignments in Facility…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…