相关论文: Price Regulation and Network Spillovers

We examine optimal regulation of financial networks with debt interdependencies between financial firms. We first show that firms often have an incentive to choose excessively risky portfolios and overly correlate their portfolios with…

As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…

We consider a financial market in which traders potentially face restrictions in trading some of the available securities. Traders are heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs and risk profiles, and the market is assumed thin: traders…

This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…

We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that…

This paper examines whether widely used online learning algorithms in pricing can independently reach competitive outcomes or instead foster tacit collusion. This issue has drawn considerable attention from competition regulators as…

We study the effects of introducing information inefficiency in a model for a random linear economy with a representative consumer. This is done by considering statistical, instead of classical, economic general equilibria. Employing two…

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is…

A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…

Successful achievement of public policies requires satisfaction of conditions affecting political feasibility for policy adoption and maintenance as well as economic viability of the desired activity or enterprise. This paper discusses the…

Social media platforms have diverse content moderation policies, with many prominent actors hesitant to impose strict regulations. A key reason for this reluctance could be the competitive advantage that comes with lax regulation. A popular…

A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the…

We consider a principal seller with $m$ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item…

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…

This paper proposes an agent-based model that combines both spot and balancing electricity markets. From this model, we develop a multi-agent simulation to study the integration of the consumers' flexibility into the system. Our study…

Product ranking is the core problem for revenue-maximizing online retailers. To design proper product ranking algorithms, various consumer choice models are proposed to characterize the consumers' behaviors when they are provided with a…

I show that firms price almost competitively and consumers can infer product quality from prices in markets where firms differ in quality and production cost, and learning prices is costly. Bankruptcy risk or regulation links higher quality…

A central goal in algorithmic game theory is to analyze the performance of decentralized multiagent systems, like communication and information networks. In the absence of a central planner who can enforce how these systems are utilized,…

An online seller or platform is technically able to offer every consumer a different price for the same product, based on information it has about the customers. Such online price discrimination exacerbates concerns regarding the fairness…

We examine problems of ``intermediated implementation,'' in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and agents with hidden characteristics. An example is sales, in…