相关论文: Autocratic strategies in Cournot oligopoly game

The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies,…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, where a player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum…

Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…

Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial…

Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to…

Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…

In a single-state repeated game, zero-determinant strategies can unilaterally force functions of the payoffs to take values in particular closed intervals. When the explicit use of a determinant is absent from the analysis, they are instead…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…

Mixed extension has played an important role in game theory, especially in the proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in strategic form games. Mixed extension can be regarded as continuous relaxation of a strategic form game. Recently,…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

Repeated games are a framework for investigating long-term interdependence of multi-agent systems. In repeated games, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies attract much attention in evolutionary game theory, since they can unilaterally control…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs.…

Recent work has revealed a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies for iterated, two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her score and her opponent's score, and thus…