相关论文: Agency Problems and Adversarial Bilevel Optimizati…

Hierarchical decision problems are often modeled as bilevel programs in which a leader commits to a policy and a follower responds optimally. When the follower's optimal response is nonunique, or when only near-optimal follower behavior can…

We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack, while the follower chooses a feasible packing maximizing his own profit. The leader's aim is to optimize a linear objective function…

In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some equilibrium conditions and we…

The interconnectivity of cyber and physical systems and Internet of things has created ubiquitous concerns of cyber threats for enterprise system managers. It is common that the asset owners and enterprise network operators need to work…

We investigate the existence of an optimal policy to monitor a mean field systems of agents managing a risky project under moral hazard with accidents modeled by L\'evy processes magnified by the law of the project. We provide a general…

We consider pessimistic bilevel stochastic programs in which the follower maximizes over a fixed compact convex set a strictly convex quadratic function, whose Hessian depends on the leader's decision. The resulting random variable is…

The recent work by Cvitani\'c, Possama\"i, and Touzi (2018) [9] presents a general approach for continuous-time principal-agent problems, through dynamic programming and second-order backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). In…

In bilevel optimization problems, a leader and a follower make their decisions in a hierarchy, and both decisions may influence each other. Usually one assumes that both players have full knowledge also of the other player's data. In a more…

We consider bilevel linear problems, where the right-hand side of the lower level problems is stochastic. The leader has to decide in a here-and-now fashion, while the follower has complete information. In this setting, the leader's outcome…

In this paper, we consider the stochastic optimal control problem for jump diffusion systems with state constraints. In general, the value function of such problems is a discontinuous viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)…

We propose a neural network approach for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems. In particular, we focus on multi-agent control problems with obstacle and collision avoidance. These problems immediately become high-dimensional,…

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal…

We consider bilevel linear problems, where some parameters are stochastic, and the leader has to decide in a here-and-now fashion, while the follower has complete information. In this setting, the leader's outcome can be modeled by a random…

The hidden-action model provides an optimal sharing rule for situations in which a principal assigns a task to an agent who makes an effort to carry out the task assigned to him. However, the principal can only observe the task outcome but…

In this paper, we formulate cyber risk management and mitigation as a stochastic optimal control problem under a stochastic Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic model. To capture the dynamics and interplay of management and…

We study a bilevel \emph{max-max} optimization framework for principal-agent contract design, in which a principal chooses incentives to maximize utility while anticipating the agent's best response. This problem, central to moral hazard…

We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack and the follower chooses an optimal packing according to his own profits, which may differ from those of the leader. To this bilevel…

Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…

We study a principal-agent problem with adverse selection, where the principal does not know the agent's true cost but must design a contract to optimize a specific criterion. Unlike standard screening frameworks that allow for…