相关论文: How competitive are pay-as-bid auction games?

We consider colorful bin packing games in which selfish players control a set of items which are to be packed into a minimum number of unit capacity bins. Each item has one of $m\geq 2$ colors and cannot be packed next to an item of the…

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

The design of energy markets is a subject of ongoing debate, particularly concerning the choice between the widely adopted Pay-as-Clear (PC) pricing mechanism and the alternative Pay-as-Bid (PB). These mechanisms determine how energy…

Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price \alpha > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game,…

We consider a general class of Bayesian Games where each players utility depends on his type (possibly multidimensional) and on the strategy profile and where players' types are distributed independently. We show that if their full…

In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…

Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have a rigorous mathematical solution theory. The lack of…

In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure…

We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…

We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is…

We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in…

We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with…

We consider a class of adversarial classification problems in the form of zero-sum games between a classifier and an adversary. The latter is able to corrupt data, at the expense of some optimal transport cost. We show that quite general…

We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and…

Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…

We consider $n$ risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state…

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always…