相关论文: Diversity-seeking swap games in networks

We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games (SCGs), where each player's individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful abstractions…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…

The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We introduce a new class of games called the networked common goods game (NCGG), which generalizes the well-known common goods game. We focus on a fairly general subclass of the game where each agent's utility functions are the same across…

In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…

Schelling's model of segregation demonstrates that even in the absence of social or governmental interventions, individuals with mild in-group preferences can self-organize into strongly segregated neighborhoods. Many variants of this…

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their…

Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity…

It has been an old unsolved puzzle to evolutionary theorists on which mechanisms would increase large-scale cooperation in human societies. Thus, how such mechanisms operate in a biological network is still not very understood. This study…

The lack of cooperation can easily result in inequality among members of a society, which provides an increasing gap between individual incomes. To tackle this issue, we introduce an incentive mechanism based on individual strategies and…

In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…

In recent years, a significant research effort has been devoted to the design of distributed protocols for the control of multi-agent systems, as the scale and limited communication bandwidth characteristic of such systems render…

Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of…

In this paper, we introduce a framework to study local interactions due to the presence of herding behavior in a minority game. The idea behind this approach is to consider that some of the agents who play the game believe that some of…

Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…

Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…

In mix-game which is an extension of minority game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. This paper studies the change of the average winnings of agents and volatilities vs.…

In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…

We consider an agent-based model in which two types of agents interact locally over a graph and have a common intolerance threshold $\tau$ for changing their types with exponentially distributed waiting times. The model is equivalent to an…