相关论文: On the Decomposition of Differential Game
Stability landscapes are useful for understanding the properties of dynamical systems. These landscapes can be calculated from the system's dynamical equations using the physical concept of scalar potential. Unfortunately, for most…
Our paper addresses characterizing conditions for a linear quadratic (LQ) game to be a potential game. The desired properties of potential games in finite action settings, such as convergence of learning dynamics to Nash equilibria, and the…
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…
Nash Equilibrium and its robust counterpart, Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium (DRNE), are fundamental problems in game theory with applications in economics, engineering, and machine learning. This paper addresses the problem of…
Zero-sum games are natural, if informal, analogues of closed physical systems where no energy/utility can enter or exit. This analogy can be extended even further if we consider zero-sum network (polymatrix) games where multiple agents…
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into…
This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…
We consider a class of coalition formation games called hedonic games, i.e., games in which the utility of a player is completely determined by the coalition that the player belongs to. We first define the class of subset-additive hedonic…
This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textbook. Using labeled "best-response polytopes", we present the…
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are…
We use a reformulation of compositional game theory to reunite game theory with game semantics, by viewing an open game as the System and its choice of contexts as the Environment. Specifically, the system is jointly controlled by $n \geq…
This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…
Examples of games between two partners with mixed strategies, calculated by the use of the probability amplitude as some vector in Hilbert space are given. The games are macroscopic, no microscopic quantum agent is supposed. The reason for…
We consider ordinary differential equations on the unit simplex of $\RR^n$ that naturally occur in population games, models of learning and self reinforced random processes. Generalizing and relying on an idea introduced in \cite{DF11}, we…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Natural languages are powerful tools wielded by human beings to communicate information. Among their desirable properties, compositionality has been the main focus in the context of referential games and variants, as it promises to enable…
An $n$-person game is specified by $n$ tensors of the same format. We view its equilibria as points in that tensor space. Dependency equilibria are defined by linear constraints on conditional probabilities, and thus by determinantal…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central…