相关论文: Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentag…

We study the design of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms in single parameter domains, for the objective of optimizing social efficiency as measured by social cost. In the problems we consider, a group of participants compete to…

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…

In a 2017 paper, later presented at the Web and Internet Economics conference, titled ``Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice", the authors propose a mechanism in which a series of agents, are tasked to negotiate over a set of decisions…

Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives,…

We study the problem of allocating $m$ items to $n$ agents subject to maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW) objective. We write a novel convex programming relaxation for this problem, and we show that a simple randomized rounding…

We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…

Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…

In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization…

Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such…

In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…

We propose social welfare optimization as a general paradigm for formalizing fairness in AI systems. We argue that optimization models allow formulation of a wide range of fairness criteria as social welfare functions, while enabling AI to…

Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…

We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal…

We consider the problem of repeatedly choosing policies to maximize social welfare. Welfare is a weighted sum of private utility and public revenue. Earlier outcomes inform later policies. Utility is not observed, but indirectly inferred.…

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…

In several socioeconomic-critical decision-making settings, such as fair resource allocation, climate policy, or AI alignment, multiple principals interact within a common arena. While it is well established that these principals may have…

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions cannot be…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

Selecting the most influential agent in a network has huge practical value in applications. However, in many scenarios, the graph structure can only be known from agents' reports on their connections. In a self-interested setting, agents…