相关论文: The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under cardinality constraints, where each agent must receive a bundle of fixed size. This models practical scenarios, such as assigning shifts or forming equally sized teams. Recently,…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion, where…
In recent years many important societal decisions are made by machine-learning algorithms, and many such important decisions have strict capacity limits, allowing resources to be allocated only to the highest utility individuals. For…
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…
Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has been extensively studied, particularly in reward distribution among agents in scenarios such as goods allocation, resource division, lotteries, and bargaining systems. Fairness in MAS depends on…
In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
The ability to understand and trust the fairness of model predictions, particularly when considering the outcomes of unprivileged groups, is critical to the deployment and adoption of machine learning systems. SHAP values provide a unified…
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…
We consider the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating a set $\mathcal{G}$ of indivisible goods to a set $\mathcal{N}$ of agents. We study instances, in which all agents have 2-value additive valuations: The value of…
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…
We study almost-envy-freeness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives exactly one house. An envy-free allocation need not exist, and therefore we may have to settle for…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
Online advertising systems have recently transitioned to autobidding, allowing advertisers to delegate bidding decisions to automated agents. Each advertiser directs their agent to optimize an objective function subject to…
We study budget aggregation under $\ell_1$-utilities, a model for collective decision making in which agents with heterogeneous preferences must allocate a public budget across a set of alternatives. Each agent reports their preferred…
Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the…
Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions…