相关论文: Cooperative envy-free division

We consider a one-sided matching problem where agents who are partitioned into disjoint classes and each class must receive fair treatment in a desired matching. This model, proposed by Benabbou et al. [2019], aims to address various…

We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated…

Fair division is the problem of allocating a set of items among agents in a fair manner. One of the most sought-after fairness notions is envy-freeness (EF), requiring that no agent envies another's allocation. When items are indivisible,…

Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…

We consider the problem of resolving the envy of a given initial allocation by adding elements from a pool of goods. We give a characterization of the instances where envy can be resolved by adding an arbitrary number of copies of the items…

We study an application of fair division theory to school redistricting. Procaccia, Robinson, and Tucker-Foltz (SODA 2024) recently proposed a mathematical model to generate redistricting plans that provide theoretically guaranteed fairness…

A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the…

We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…

Rent division is the well-studied problem of fairly assigning rooms and dividing rent among a set of roommates within a single apartment. A shortcoming of existing solutions is that renters are assumed to be considering apartments in…

We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent's share.…

Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…

The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…

We consider the house allocation problem, where $m$ houses are to be assigned to $n$ agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so,…

Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…

The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…

We study a fair resource sharing problem, where a set of resources are to be shared among a group of agents. Each agent demands one resource and each resource can serve a limited number of agents. An agent cares about what resource they get…

A group of friends organize their tennis games by submitting each their availability over the weekdays. They want to obtain an assignment such that: each game must be a double tennis match, i.e. requires four people, and nobody plays in a…

We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…