相关论文: Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant a…

We consider the algorithmic question of choosing a subset of candidates of a given size $k$ from a set of $m$ candidates, with knowledge of voters' ordinal rankings over all candidates. We consider the well-known and classic scoring rule…

We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for…

We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…

The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. However, they often admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic…

We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their…

Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC)…

We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal committee of size $k$ under any given Thiele voting rule for elections on the Voter Interval domain (i.e., when voters can be ordered so that each candidate is approved by a…

The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…

To choose a suitable multiwinner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an ``optimal'' subset of alternatives. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of…

We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…

We provide experimental evaluation of a number of known and new algorithms for approximate computation of Monroe's and Chamberlin-Courant's rules. Our experiments, conducted both on real-life preference-aggregation data and on synthetic…

A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced…

Multiwinner Elections have emerged as a prominent area of research with numerous practical applications. We contribute to this area by designing parameterized approximation algorithms and also resolving an open question by Yang and Wang…

We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no…

Approval-Based Committee (ABC) rules are an important tool for choosing a fair set of candidates when given the preferences of a collection of voters. Though finding a winning committee for many ABC rules is NP-hard, natural variations for…

We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules---Chamberlin--Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be…

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination…