相关论文: Simulating numerically the Krusell-Smith model wit…

Zero-sum stochastic games are easy to solve as they can be cast as simple Markov decision processes. This is however not the case with general-sum stochastic games. A fairly general optimization problem formulation is available for…

We study a toy model of linear-quadratic mean field game with delay. We "lift" the delayed dynamic into an infinite dimensional space, and recast the mean field game system which is made of a forward Kolmogorov equation and a backward…

In this paper, we consider a mean field game (MFG) model perturbed by small common noise. Our goal is to give an approximation of the Nash equilibrium strategy of this game using a solution from the original no common noise MFG whose…

We present in this paper detailed numerical Vlasov simulations of the Hamiltonian Mean-Field model. This model is used as a representative of the class of systems under long-range interactions. We check existing results on the stability of…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…

The convexification numerical method with the rigorously established global convergence property is constructed for a problem for the Mean Field Games System of the second order. This is the problem of the retrospective analysis of a game…

There seems to be an upper limit to predicting the outcome of matches in (semi-)professional sports. Recent work has proposed that this is due to chance and attempts have been made to simulate the distribution of win percentages to identify…

Quasi-stationary Mean Field Games models consider agents who base their strategies on current information without forecasting future states. In this paper we address the first-order quasi-stationary Mean Field Games system, which involves…

We study mean field games with scalar It{\^o}-type dynamics and costs that are submodular with respect to a suitable order relation on the state and measure space. The submodularity assumption has a number of interesting consequences.…

Simultaneous reproduction of all financial stylized facts is so difficult that most existing stochastic process-based and agent-based models are unable to achieve the goal. In this study, by extending the decision-making structure of…

Forcing finite state mean field games by a relevant form of common noise is a subtle issue, which has been addressed only recently. Among others, one possible way is to subject the simplex valued dynamics of an equilibrium by a so-called…

We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…

In this paper, we investigate the robustness of stationary mean-field equilibria in the presence of model uncertainties, specifically focusing on infinite-horizon discounted cost functions. To achieve this, we initially establish…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

Using a statistical model-based data generation, we develop an experimental setup for the evaluation of neural networks (NNs). The setup helps to benchmark a set of NNs vis-a-vis minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) performance bounds. This…

This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…

In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players' strategies are coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we prove that…

The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called proportional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic…

Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic system. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared to single-agent…

We review the recent approaches to modelling financial markets based on multi-agent systems. After a brief summary of the basic stylised facts observed in real-market time-series we discuss some simple agent-based systems which are…