相关论文: The topology in the game controllability of multia…

Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…

It is typical to assume that there is no conflict of interest among leaders. Under such assumption, it is known that, for a multi-agent system with two leaders, if the followers' interaction subgraph is undirected and connected, then…

This paper considers the controllability problem for multi-agent systems. In particular, the structural controllability of multi-agent systems under switching topologies is investigated. The structural controllability of multi-agent systems…

In this paper, the target controllability of multiagent systems under directed weighted topology is studied. A graph partition is constructed, in which part of the nodes are divided into different cells, which are selected as leaders. The…

In this paper we study the controllability of networked systems with static network topologies using tools from algebraic graph theory. Each agent in the network acts in a decentralized fashion by updating its state in accordance with a…

A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…

Motivated by the self-pursuit of controlled objects, we consider the exact controllability of a linear mean-field type game-based control system (MF-GBCS, for short) generated by a linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) Nash game. A Gram-type…

This paper examines the structural controllability for a group of agents, called followers, connected to each other based on the consensus law under commands of multiple leaders, which are agents with superior capabilities, over a fixed…

This paper presents conditions for establishing topological controllability in undirected networks of diffusively coupled agents. Specifically, controllability is considered based on the signs of the edges (negative, positive or zero). Our…

Multiagent systems consist of agents that locally exchange information through a physical network subject to a graph topology. Current control methods for networked multiagent systems assume the knowledge of graph topologies in order to…

Many real-world systems are composed of many individual components that interact with one another in a complex pattern to produce diverse behaviors. Understanding how to intervene in these systems to guide behaviors is critically important…

This note investigates how to design topology structures to ensure the controllability of multi-agent networks (MASs) under any selection of leaders. We put forward a concept of perfect controllability, which means that a multi-agent system…

In this technical note, we study the controllability of diffusively coupled networks from a graph theoretic perspective. We consider leader-follower networks, where the external control inputs are injected to only some of the agents, namely…

Designing distributed optimal controllers subject to communication constraints is a difficult problem unless structural assumptions are imposed on the underlying dynamics and information exchange structure, e.g., sparsity, delay, or spatial…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…

In this paper, controllability of systems defined on graphs is discussed. We consider the problem of controllability of the network for a family of matrices carrying the structure of an underlying directed graph. A one-to-one correspondence…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

This paper addresses questions regarding controllability for `generic parameter' dynamical systems, i.e. the question whether a dynamical system is `structurally controllable'. Unlike conventional methods that deal with structural…