相关论文: Robustness of Greedy Approval Rules

In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…

This paper is devoted to the theoretical study of the efficiency, namely, stability of some greedy algorithms. In the greedy approximation theory researchers are mostly interested in the following two important properties of an algorithm --…

We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering the projects' costs, obtaining additional approvals for…

Identifying cause-effect relations among variables is a key step in the decision-making process. While causal inference requires randomized experiments, researchers and policymakers are increasingly using observational studies to test…

We study the parameterized complexity of counting variants of Swap- and Shift-Bribery problems, focusing on the parameterizations by the number of swaps and the number of voters. We show experimentally that Swap-Bribery offers a new…

We consider a single-server system with service stations in each point of the circle. Customers arrive after exponential times at uniformly-distributed locations. The server moves at finite speed and adopts a greedy routing mechanism. It…

The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. However, they often admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic…

Motivated by modern applications such as computerized adaptive testing, sequential rank aggregation, and heterogeneous data source selection, we study the problem of active sequential estimation, which involves adaptively selecting…

We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…

The successive and the amendment procedures have been widely employed in parliamentary and legislative decision making and have undergone extensive study in the literature from various perspectives. However, investigating them through the…

Participatory budgeting (PB) has attracted much attention in recent times due to its wide applicability in social choice settings. In this paper, we consider indivisible PB which involves allocating an available, limited budget to a set of…

Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, Horan and Sprumont [2022] proposed…

We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers. Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for…

In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all…

We investigate at decision trees that incorporate both traditional queries based on one attribute and queries based on hypotheses about the values of all attributes. Such decision trees are similar to ones studied in exact learning, where…

We propose a new concept named adaptive submodularity ratio to study the greedy policy for sequential decision making. While the greedy policy is known to perform well for a wide variety of adaptive stochastic optimization problems in…

In approval-based committee (ABC) elections, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. One of the most popular classes of ABC voting rules…

The Chamberlin-Courant and Monroe rules are fundamental and well-studied rules in the literature of multi-winner elections. The problem of determining if there exists a committee of size k that has a Chamberlin-Courant (respectively,…

We investigate issues related to two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Christian et al. [CFRS06] showed that optimal lobbying is…

We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee…