相关论文: Robustness of Greedy Approval Rules

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth…

We study robust nonlinear filtering for stochastic models driven by L\'evy processes, where the signal and observation processes are coupled through common Brownian and jump noise. Robustness, defined as the continuous dependence of the…

A greedy randomized augmented Kaczmarz (GRAK) method was proposed in [Z.-Z. Bai and W.-T. WU, SIAM J. Sci. Comput., 43 (2021), pp. A3892-A3911] for large and sparse inconsistent linear systems. However, one has to construct two new index…

The nonlinear Kaczmarz method was recently proposed to solve the system of nonlinear equations. In this paper, we first discuss two greedy selection rules, i.e., the maximum residual and maximum distance rules, for the nonlinear Kaczmarz…

In many applications, it becomes necessary for a set of distributed network nodes to agree on a common value or opinion as quickly as possible and with minimal communication overhead. The classical 2-choices rule is a well-known distributed…

We study the complexity of determining a winning committee under the Chamberlin--Courant voting rule when voters' preferences are single-crossing on a line, or, more generally, on a median graph (this class of graphs includes, e.g., trees…

The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions…

Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…

We identify and study the phenomenon of policy churn, that is, the rapid change of the greedy policy in value-based reinforcement learning. Policy churn operates at a surprisingly rapid pace, changing the greedy action in a large fraction…

In many circumstances there is a trade off between the number of voters and the time they can be given before having to make a decision since both aspects are costly. An example is the hiring of a committee with a fixed salary budget: more…

We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…

Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…

Active learning is increasingly adopted for expensive multi-objective combinatorial optimization problems, but it involves a challenging subset selection problem, optimizing the batch acquisition score that quantifies the goodness of a…

We study a logistic model-based active learning procedure for binary classification problems, in which we adopt a batch subject selection strategy with a modified sequential experimental design method. Moreover, accompanying the proposed…

We study the complexity of a fundamental algorithm for fairly allocating indivisible items, the round-robin algorithm. For $n$ agents and $m$ items, we show that the algorithm can be implemented in time $O(nm\log(m/n))$ in the worst case.…

Fast Paxos is an algorithm for consensus that works by a succession of rounds, where each round tries to decide a value $v$ that is consistent with all past rounds. Rounds are started by a coordinator process and consistency is guaranteed…

We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given…

We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment model. If the common prior of the agents is a uniform prior,…