相关论文: Reforming an Envy-Free Matching

The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…

We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random allocation that is simultaneously ex-ante…

We consider the problem of allocating a distribution of items to $n$ recipients where each recipient has to be allocated a fixed, prespecified fraction of all items, while ensuring that each recipient does not experience too much envy. We…

We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…

We study the distribution of envy in random matching markets under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using tools from applied probability, we compute the expected number of proposing agents whom nobody envies and those who envy…

We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want…

We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to…

We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We obtain novel approximation guarantees for three of the strongest fairness notions in discrete fair division, namely envy-free up to the removal of any…

We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1+- and EFX+-. We compare these with the existing EF1 and…

We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among $n$ agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one. Under monotone valuations (where each item is a good), Brustle et al. (2020) demonstrated…

We study fair division of goods under the broad class of generalized assignment constraints. In this constraint framework, the sizes and values of the goods are agent-specific, and one needs to allocate the goods among the agents fairly…

We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…

We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by…

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to find an envy-free allocation based on queries from $n$ agents. The problem has received attention in computer science, mathematics, and economics. It has been a major…

A matching in a bipartite graph with parts X and Y is called envy-free if no unmatched vertex in X is a adjacent to a matched vertex in Y. Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings exist even when perfect matchings do…

We study a fair division model where indivisible items arrive sequentially, and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Previous work on online fair division has shown impossibility results in achieving approximate envy-freeness…

Recommender systems are facing scrutiny because of their growing impact on the opportunities we have access to. Current audits for fairness are limited to coarse-grained parity assessments at the level of sensitive groups. We propose to…

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a…

A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…