相关论文: Reforming an Envy-Free Matching

We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…

We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…

The problem of allocating indivisible resources to agents arises in a wide range of domains, including treatment distribution and social support programs. An important goal in algorithm design for this problem is fairness, where the focus…

This paper studies the allocation of indivisible items to agents, when each agent's preferences are expressed by means of a directed acyclic graph. The vertices of each preference graph represent the subset of items approved of by the…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical, additive valuations but individual budget constraints. Here, the indivisible goods--each with a specific size and value--need to be allocated such that the…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…

The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. [2] as a procedure for identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of objects. They assumed that agents have strict preferences over objects and their…

Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…

We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…

We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is \emph{agreeable} to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with…

Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a popular and important fairness property in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, of which its existence in general is still an open question. In this work, we investigate the problem of…

Envy-freeness is one of the most widely studied notions in fair division. Since envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible, several relaxations have been considered. Among them, possibly the most compelling concept…

A set of divisible resources becomes available over a sequence of rounds and needs to be allocated immediately and irrevocably. Our goal is to distribute these resources to maximize fairness and efficiency. Achieving any non-trivial…

We study several fairness notions in allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive values) to agents who have additive and submodular cost functions. The fairness criteria we are concern with are envy-free up to any item…

We investigate the existence of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible chores to asymmetric agents who have unequal entitlements or weights. We consider the fairness notion of weighted envy-freeness up to one chore (wEF1) and the…

Recently, many matching systems around the world have been reformed. These reforms responded to objections that the matching mechanisms in use were unfair and manipulable. Surprisingly, the mechanisms remained unfair even after the reforms:…

Envy-Freeness is one of the most fundamental and important concepts in fair allocation. Some recent studies have focused on the concept of weighted envy-freeness. Under this concept, each agent is assigned a weight, and their valuations are…