相关论文: Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in m…

We study mean field games with scalar It{\^o}-type dynamics and costs that are submodular with respect to a suitable order relation on the state and measure space. The submodularity assumption has a number of interesting consequences.…

In this paper, we study the problem of learning in quantum games - and other classes of semidefinite games - with scalar, payoff-based feedback. For concreteness, we focus on the widely used matrix multiplicative weights (MMW) algorithm…

The objective of this work is to study the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria in mean field games involving a major player and a continuum of minor players over finite intervals of arbitrary length. Following earlier…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

We consider the following two-player game: Maxi and Mini start with the empty graph on $n$ vertices and take turns, always adding one additional edge to the graph such that the chromatic number is at most $k$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$ is a…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…

Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to…

We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium…

Blackwell approachability, regret minimization and calibration are three criteria evaluating a strategy (or an algorithm) in different sequential decision problems, or repeated games between a player and Nature. Although they have at first…

A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define…

We study two-player games of infinite duration that are played on finite or infinite game graphs. A winning strategy for such a game is positional if it only depends on the current position, and not on the history of the play. A game is…

We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued repeated games. The famous Blackwell's approachability theorem prescribes a strategy for approachability, i.e., for `steering' the average cost of…

This paper uses value functions to characterize the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of an arbitrary, possibly infinite-horizon game. It specifies the game's extensive form as a pentaform (Streufert 2023p, arXiv:2107.10801v4), which…