相关论文: Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in m…

In the paper we present a model of discrete-time mean-field game with several populations of players. Mean-field games with multiple populations of the players have only been studied in the literature in the continuous-time setting. The…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

We study two-player games of infinite duration that are played on finite or infinite game graphs. A winning strategy for such a game is positional if it only depends on the current position, and not on the history of the play. A game is…

In this paper, we study games with continuous action spaces and non-linear payoff functions. Our key insight is that Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function allows us to provide algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these…

Markov Decision Problems (MDPs) provide a foundational framework for modelling sequential decision-making across diverse domains, guided by optimality criteria such as discounted and average rewards. However, these criteria have inherent…

We consider maximal kernel-operators on abstract measure spaces $(X,\mu)$ equipped with a ball-basis. We prove that under certain asymptotic condition on the kernels those operators maps boundedly BMO(X) into BLO(X), generalizing the…

We study zero-sum turn-based games on graphs. In this note, we show the existence of a game objective that is $\mathbf{\Pi}^0_3$-complete for the Borel hierarchy and that is positional, i.e., for which positional strategies suffice for the…

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…

This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have been attracting a great deal of attention because of their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems. Although significant progress has been made recently, the…

Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…

We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…

We study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that Player 1 has a…

We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…

We consider both discrete and continuous time finite state-action stochastic games. In discrete time stochastic games, it is known that a stationary Blackwell-Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists for a single controller additive reward (SC-AR)…

The window mechanism, introduced by Chatterjee et al. for mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives in two-player turn-based games on graphs, refines long-term objectives with time bounds. This mechanism has proven useful in a variety of…

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…