相关论文: Popular matchings with weighted voters

We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching…

The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…

We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…

Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…

Suppose that each member of a set of agents has a preference list of a subset of houses, possibly involving ties and each agent and house has their capacity denoting the maximum number of correspondingly agents/houses that can be matched to…

Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular…

Given a graph $G = (V,E)$ where every vertex has a weak ranking over its neighbors, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching as per agent preferences. Classical notions of optimality such as stability and its relaxation…

We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…

Popular matchings have been intensively studied recently as a relaxed concept of stable matchings. By applying the concept of popular matchings to branchings in directed graphs, Kavitha et al.\ (2020) introduced popular branchings. In a…

Existence of a perfect matching in a random bipartite digraph with bipartition $(V_1, V_2)$, $|V_i|=n$, is studied. The graph is generated in two rounds of random selections of a potential matching partner such that the average number of…

We study the problem of counting the number of popular matchings in a given instance. A popular matching instance consists of agents A and houses H, where each agent ranks a subset of houses according to their preferences. A matching is an…

We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…

We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. The popular matchings problem can be defined as follows: Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges…

We study popular matchings in three classical settings: the house allocation problem, the marriage problem, and the roommates problem. In the popular matching problem, (a subset of) the vertices in a graph have preference orderings over…

We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time…

The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…

We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…

We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…

Let $G$ be a digraph where every node has preferences over its incoming edges. The preferences of a node extend naturally to preferences over branchings, i.e., directed forests; a branching $B$ is popular if $B$ does not lose a head-to-head…

We consider the well-studied Hospital Residents (HR) problem in the presence of lower quotas (LQ). The input instance consists of a bipartite graph $G = (\mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{H}, E)$ where $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{H}$ denote sets of…