相关论文: On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in Fi…

The competition complexity of an auction setting is the number of additional bidders needed such that the simple mechanism of selling items separately (with additional bidders) achieves greater revenue than the optimal but complex…

We study the computational complexity of computing or approximating a quasi-proper equilibrium for a given finite extensive form game of perfect recall. We show that the task of computing a symbolic quasi-proper equilibrium is…

In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…

Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when bidders' valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. We develop a test of…

This paper examines how risk and budget limits on investment mandates affect the bidding strategy in a uniform-price auction for issuing corporate bonds. I prove the existence of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium and explore how the risk…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser…

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…

We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…

We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…

This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by…

Classical algorithms for market equilibrium computation such as proportional response dynamics face scalability issues with Internet-based applications such as auctions, recommender systems, and fair division, despite having an almost…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…

We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two…

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal…