相关论文: Twofold Multiprior Preferences and Failures of Con…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

This study introduces a novel model that effectively captures asymmetric structures in multivariate contingency tables with ordinal categories. Leveraging the principle of maximum entropy, our approach employs f-divergence to provide a…

We study the analyticity of the value function in optimal investment with expected utility from terminal wealth and the relation to stochastically dominant financial models. We identify both a class of utilities and a class of…

Qualitative and quantitative approaches to reasoning about uncertainty can lead to different logical systems for formalizing such reasoning, even when the language for expressing uncertainty is the same. In the case of reasoning about…

We provide a unifying way to analyze how risk aversion changes bidding in auctions by asking which bids become more attractive as bidders become more risk averse. In first-price auctions, under two payoff conditions--winning is never worse…

For optimal stopping problems with time-inconsistent preference, we measure the inherent level of time-inconsistency by taking the time needed to turn the naive strategies into the sophisticated ones. In particular, when in a repeated…

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…

In the competing risks problem, an important role is played by the cumulative incidence function (CIF), whose value at time $t$ is the probability of failure by time $t$ from a particular type of failure in the presence of other risks. In…

The determination of acceptability prices of contingent claims requires the choice of a stochastic model for the underlying asset price dynamics. Given this model, optimal bid and ask prices can be found by stochastic optimization. However,…

We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…

Unaided human decision making appears to systematically violate consistency constraints imposed by normative theories; these biases in turn appear to justify the application of formal decision-analytic models. It is argued that both claims…

Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual…

Possibilistic logic, an extension of first-order logic, deals with uncertainty that can be estimated in terms of possibility and necessity measures. Syntactically, this means that a first-order formula is equipped with a possibility degree…

We study risk-free bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions with incomplete information. Specifically, what is the maximum profit that a complement-free (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in a multi-item combinatorial auction? Suppose…

In multi-objective decision planning and learning, much attention is paid to producing optimal solution sets that contain an optimal policy for every possible user preference profile. We argue that the step that follows, i.e, determining…

A mathematical model of Subject behaviour choice is proposed. The background of the model is the concept of two preference relations determining Subject behaviour. These are an "internal" or subjective preference relation and an "external"…

The first-order theory of MALL (multiplicative, additive linear logic) over only equalities is an interesting but weak logic since it cannot capture unbounded (infinite) behavior. Instead of accounting for unbounded behavior via the…

A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she announces a menu of products and prices, each agent $x$ will choose to buy that product $y(x)$ which maximizes his own utility, if positive. The…

We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…

This note pursues two primary objectives. First, we analyze the outcomes of an all-pay auction within a store where buyers with and without financial constraints arrive at varying rates, and where buyer types are private information.…