相关论文: Twofold Multiprior Preferences and Failures of Con…

We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…

We bound features of counterfactual choices in the nonparametric random utility model of demand, i.e. if observable choices are repeated cross-sections and one allows for unrestricted, unobserved heterogeneity. In this setting, tight bounds…

We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…

Using theory and experiments, this paper shows that the difficulty of making tradeoffs offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of behavioral phenomena. We develop a model of imprecise comparisons applicable to multiattribute,…

This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…

AI alignment, the challenge of ensuring AI systems act in accordance with human values, has emerged as a critical problem in the development of systems such as foundation models and recommender systems. Still, the current dominant approach,…

Choice overload - in which larger choice sets are detrimental to a chooser's well-being - is potentially of great importance in the design of economic policy. Yet the current evidence on its prevalence is inconclusive. We argue that…

Many systems that exhibit nonmonotonic behavior have been described and studied already in the literature. The general notion of nonmonotonic reasoning, though, has almost always been described only negatively, by the property it does not…

Default logic can be regarded as a mechanism to represent families of belief sets of a reasoning agent. As such, it is inherently second-order. In this paper, we study the problem of representability of a family of theories as the set of…

A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to execute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in network architectures that is driven by the sharing of…

Choice functions accept a set of alternatives as input and produce a preferred subset of these alternatives as output. We study the problem of learning such functions under conditions of context-dependence of preferences, which means that…

We consider the problem of maximizing an unknown function over a compact and convex set using as few observations as possible. We observe that the optimization of the function essentially relies on learning the induced bipartite ranking…

We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…

The saturation-based reasoning methods are among the most theoretically developed ones and are used by most of the state-of-the-art first-order logic reasoners. In the last decade there was a sharp increase in performance of such systems,…

In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning…

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an…

We consider the problem of estimating a ranking on a set of items from noisy pairwise comparisons given item features. We address the fact that pairwise comparison data often reflects irrational choice, e.g. intransitivity. Our key…

We explore the approximation power of deterministic obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in auctions, where the objective is welfare maximization. A trivial ascending auction on the grand bundle guarantees an approximation of $\min\{m,n\}$…

Behavioral experiments on the ultimatum game (UG) reveal that we humans prefer fair acts, which contradicts the prediction made in orthodox Economics. Existing explanations, however, are mostly attributed to exogenous factors within the…