相关论文: Application of Coupled Fixed (or Best Proximity) P…
In this paper we generalize Hardy-Rogers maps in the context of coupled fixed points. We generalizes with the help of the obtained main theorem some known results about existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in duopoly markets. We…
We analyze a canonical extension of the Stackelberg duopoly to a sequential framework, where each firm strategically anticipates the reactions of all subsequent players. In a triopoly (three-firm) settings, we obtain existence and…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
The rise of the machine learning (ML) model economy has intertwined markets for training datasets and pre-trained models. However, most pricing approaches still separate data and model transactions or rely on broker-centric pipelines that…
This work presents a unified framework that combines global approximations with locally built models to handle challenging nonconvex and nonsmooth composite optimization problems, including cases involving extended real-valued functions. We…
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…
This paper revisits the well-studied fixed point problem from a unified viewpoint of mathematical modeling and canonical duality theory, i.e. the original problem is first reformulated as a nonconvex optimization problem, its well-posedness…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
This paper is the continuation of "Pricing with coherent risk" and deals with further applications of coherent risk measures to problems of finance. First, we study the optimization problem. Three forms of this problem are considered.…
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…
We consider scalar equilibrium problems governed by a bifunction in a finite-dimensional framework. By using classical arguments in Convex Analysis, we show that under suitable generalized convexity assumptions imposed on the bifunction,…
We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system's equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well known paradox in multimarket Cournot…
We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm - from the perspective of a customer - depends on the congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for…
We revisit the classic Cournot model and extend it to a two-echelon supply chain with an upstream supplier who operates under demand uncertainty and multiple downstream retailers who compete over quantity. The supplier's belief about retail…
We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…