相关论文: The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equ…
Instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) is a standard game-theoretic concept in dynamic traffic assignment in which individual flow particles myopically select en route currently shortest paths towards their destination. We analyze IDE…
We study dynamic network flows and introduce a notion of instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) requiring that for any positive inflow into an edge, this edge must lie on a currently shortest path towards the respective sink. We measure…
Flows over time are a natural way to incorporate flow dynamics that arise in various applications such as traffic networks. In this paper we introduce a natural variant of the deterministic fluid queuing model in which users aim to minimize…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
We study a dynamic routing game motivated by traffic flows. The base model for an edge is the Vickrey bottleneck model. That is, edges are equipped with a free flow transit time and a capacity. When the inflow into an edge exceeds its…
A fluid queuing network constitutes one of the simplest models in which to study flow dynamics over a network. In this model we have a single source-sink pair and each link has a per-time-unit capacity and a transit time. A dynamic…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
This paper continues the study of equilibria for flows over time in the fluid queueing model recently considered by Koch and Skutella [10]. We provide a constructive proof for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria in the case of a…
Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…
Understanding neural dynamics is a central topic in machine learning, non-linear physics and neuroscience. However, the dynamics is non-linear, stochastic and particularly non-gradient, i.e., the driving force can not be written as gradient…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
In this paper we consider the price of anarchy (PoA) in multi-commodity flows where the latency or delay function on an edge has a heterogeneous dependency on the flow commodities, i.e. when the delay on each link is dependent on the flow…
In this paper, we introduce an improved upper bound for the efficiency of Nash equilibria in utilitarian scheduling games on related machines. The machines have varying speeds and adhere to the Shortest Processing Time (SPT) policy as the…
We consider dynamic equilibria for flows over time under the fluid queuing model. In this model, queues on the links of a network take care of flow propagation. Flow enters the network at a single source and leaves at a single sink. In a…
We consider optimal control of a stochastic network,where service is controlled to prevent buffer overflow. We use a risk-sensitive escape time criterion, which in comparison to the ordinary escape time criteria heavily penalizes exits…
Service platforms must determine rules for matching heterogeneous demand (customers) and supply (workers) that arrive randomly over time and may be lost if forced to wait too long for a match. Our objective is to maximize the cumulative…