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Consumers of Internet content typically pay an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to connect to the Internet. A content provider (CP) may charge consumers for its content or may earn via advertising revenue. In such settings, a matter of…

We embed buying rights into a (repeated) Arrow-Debreu model to study the long-term effects of regulation through buying rights on arising inequality. Our motivation stems from situations that typically call for regulatory interventions,…

We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…

We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…

We study a producer's problem of selling a product to a continuum of privacy-conscious consumers, where the producer can implement third-degree price discrimination, offering different prices to different market segments. We consider a…

We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…

We consider an agent who has access to a financial market, including derivative contracts, who looks to maximise her utility. Whilst the agent looks to maximise utility over one probability measure, or class of probability measures, she…

This paper studies the optimal investment problem with random endowment in an inventory-based price impact model with competitive market makers. Our goal is to analyze how price impact affects optimal policies, as well as both pricing rules…

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…

Suppliers of differentiated goods make simultaneous pricing decisions, which are strategically linked. Because of market power, the equilibrium is inefficient. We study how a policymaker should target a budget-balanced tax-and-subsidy…

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…

Interference between treated and untreated units is a source of bias in marketplace experiments. In this paper, we specifically consider pricing interventions, in which a platform seeks to adjust base pricing levels at the marketplace level…

Electricity distribution companies deploy battery storage to defer grid upgrades by reducing peak demand. In deregulated jurisdictions, such storage often sits idle because regulatory constraints bar participation in electricity markets.…

We study arbitrage opportunities, market viability and utility maximization in market models with an insider. Assuming that an economic agent possesses from the beginning an additional information in the form of a random variable G, which…

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the…

What fraction of the potential social surplus in an environment can be extracted by a revenue-maximizing monopolist? We investigate this problem in Bayesian single-parameter environments with independent private values. The precise answer…

In a market system, regulations are designed to prevent or rectify market failures that inhibit fair exchange, such as monopoly or transactions with hidden costs. Because regulations reduce profits to those possessing unfair advantage,…

We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externalities to a third party that is neither the buyer nor the seller, but where both the buyer and seller can take steps to mitigate the externality. The motivating example to…

No one doubts the utility of insurance for its ability to spread risk or streamline claims management; much debated is when and how insurance uptake can improve welfare by reducing harm, despite moral hazard. Proponents and dissenters of…

We study the effects of allowing paid prioritization arrangements in a market with content provider (CP) competition. We consider competing CPs who pay prioritization fees to a monopolistic ISP so as to offset the ISP's cost for investing…