相关论文: Approximately Stable Committee Selection
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
The Standard Simplex Conjecture and the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture are two conjectures stating that certain partitions are optimal with respect to Gaussian and discrete noise stability respectively. These two conjectures are natural…
Given the significance of physical measures in understanding the complexity of dynamical systems as well as the noisy nature of real-world systems, investigating the stability of physical measures under noise perturbations is undoubtedly a…
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of…
Given a graph $G = (V,E)$ where every vertex has a weak ranking over its neighbors, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching as per agent preferences. Classical notions of optimality such as stability and its relaxation…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of…
The stability of a leadership against a growing internal opposition is studied in bottom-up hierarchical organizations. Using a very simple model with bottom-up majority rule voting, the dynamics of power distribution at the various…
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…
The common understanding of protein evolution has been that neutral or slightly deleterious mutations are fixed by random drift, and evolutionary rate is determined primarily by the proportion of neutral mutations. However, recent studies…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the projectivisation of a slope semistable vector bundle to admit constant scalar curvature K\"ahler (cscK) metrics in adiabatic classes, when the base admits a constant scalar curvature…
It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset…
In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…