相关论文: Stackelberg Punishment and Bully-Proofing Autonomo…

We consider the multi-agent spatial navigation problem of computing the socially optimal order of play, i.e., the sequence in which the agents commit to their decisions, and its associated equilibrium in an N-player Stackelberg trajectory…

This paper investigates a robust incentive Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem for a linear-quadratic mean field system, where the model uncertainty appears in the drift term of the leader's state equation. Moreover, both the…

Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with…

We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…

This paper studies a three party energy management problem in a user interactive smart community that consists of a large number of residential units (RUs) with distributed energy resources (DERs), a shared facility controller (SFC) and the…

We study Stackelberg games where a principal repeatedly interacts with a non-myopic long-lived agent, without knowing the agent's payoff function. Although learning in Stackelberg games is well-understood when the agent is myopic, dealing…

This study investigates an adaptive pricing scheme aimed at achieving an efficient state in a traffic congestion game characterized by a diverse population of road users. While the planner possesses knowledge of players' preferences, their…

In this paper, we investigate a new model of a linear-quadratic mean-field stochastic Stackelberg differential game with one leader and two followers, in which the leader is allowed to stop her strategy at a random time. Our overarching…

We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…

Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…

Formulating cyber-security problems with attackers and defenders as a partially observable stochastic game has become a trend recently. Among them, the one-sided two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic game (OTZ-POSG) has…

The mitigation of the effects of climate change on humankind is one of the most pressing and important collective governance problems nowadays$^{1-4}$. To explore different solutions and scenarios, previous works have framed this problem…

Demand-side management (DSM) enables distribution system operators (DSOs) to steer electricity consumption through dynamic price signals or incentive mechanisms, thereby leveraging end-users' flexibility potential for delivering grid…

Electing a leader is a classical problem in distributed computing system. Synchronization between processes often requires one process acting as a coordinator. If an elected leader node fails, the other nodes of the system need to elect…

Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…

Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride…

User interactions in online recommendation platforms create interdependencies among content creators: feedback on one creator's content influences the system's learning and, in turn, the exposure of other creators' contents. To analyze…

This study employs gamified experiments to investigate and refine the Schelling Model of Segregation, a framework that demonstrates how individual preferences can lead to systemic segregation. Using a movement selection algorithm derived…

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings…