相关论文: Stackelberg Independence

In this paper, we investigate on the modeling of demand response activities between the single aggregator and multiple participating consumers. The model incorporates the bilevel structure that naturally occurs in the information structure…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…

Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…

This paper is concerned with a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of…

I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply…

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…

Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…

Flexible loads are a resource for the Balancing Authority (BA) of the future to aid in the balance of power supply and demand. In order to be used as a resource, the BA must know the capacity of the flexible loads to vary their power demand…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

In this technical note, we consider the linear-quadratic time-inconsistent mean-field type leader-follower Stackelberg differential game with an adapted open-loop information structure. The objective functionals of the leader and the…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…

We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

We study knowable informational dependence between empirical questions, modeled as continuous functional dependence between variables in a topological setting. We also investigate epistemic independence in topological terms and show that it…

Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We…