相关论文: Stackelberg Independence
In this work, we use a Stackelberg infinite discrete-time dynamic game model to study the optimal supply schedule and the optimal demand response under a market-driven dynamic price. A two-layer optimization framework is established. At the…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
In the General Theory, Keynes remarked that the economy's state depends on expectations, and that these expectations can be subject to sudden swings. In this work, we develop a multiple equilibria behavioural business cycle model that can…
Most existing works on disentangled representation learning are solely built upon an marginal independence assumption: all factors in disentangled representations should be statistically independent. This assumption is necessary but…
Critical parts of the definitions of standard serial and standard parallel modes refer to stochastic independence. Standard serial models are defined by stochastic independence and identical distributions of their processing times.…
We study consumption dependence in the context of random utility and repeated choice. We show that, in the presence of consumption dependence, the random utility model is a misspecified model of repeated rational choice. This…
When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…
We study a sequential social learning model in which there is uncertainty about the informativeness of a common signal-generating process. Rational agents arrive in order and make decisions based on the past actions of others and their…
Despite extensive research on scientific disruption, two questions remain: why disruption has declined amid growing knowledge, and why disruptive work receives fewer and delayed citations. One way to address these questions is to identify…
This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…
We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's…
This paper is concerned with the stochastic linear quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information, where the diffusion terms contain the control and state variables. Here the term "overlapping" means that there are…
Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…
Bell inequalities may only be derived, if hidden variables do not depend on the experimental settings. The stochastic independence of hidden and setting variables is called: freedom of choice, free will, measurement independence or no…
When does society eventually learn the truth, or take the correct action, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over social networks, we identify a simple condition for learning dubbed excludability.…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
An extension of the latent class model is presented for clustering categorical data by relaxing the classical "class conditional independence assumption" of variables. This model consists in grouping the variables into inter-independent and…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
Independence testing is a classical statistical problem that has been extensively studied in the batch setting when one fixes the sample size before collecting data. However, practitioners often prefer procedures that adapt to the…
This paper presents a simple decidable logic of functional dependence LFD, based on an extension of classical propositional logic with dependence atoms plus dependence quantifiers treated as modalities, within the setting of generalized…