相关论文: Self-consistency of voting implies majority vote

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just…

Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC)…

The Majority is Stablest Theorem has numerous applications in hardness of approximation and social choice theory. We give a new proof of the Majority is Stablest Theorem by induction on the dimension of the discrete cube. Unlike the…

Incomputability results in Formal Logic and the Theory of Computation (i.e., incompleteness and undecidability) have deep implications for the foundations of mathematics and computer science. Likewise, Social Choice Theory, a branch of…

This tutorial deal with the Axiom of Choice and some of its applications to topics related to Computer Science. We will see that the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to some well-known proof principles like Zorn's Lemma or Tuckey's Maximality…

Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings as a major desideratum. For the past century or so, it is common both in practice and in the academic literature to jump to single transferable vote (STV) as the…

We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…

We consider an odd-sized "jury", which votes sequentially between two states of Nature (say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty) with the majority opinion determining the verdict. Jurors have private information in the form of a signal in…

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head…

Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…

Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In pull voting, in each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random, and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion.…

The paper by Mayo claims to provide a new clarification and critique of Birnbaum's argument for showing that sufficiency and conditionality principles imply the likelihood principle. However, much of the arguments go back to arguments made…

We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…

We consider the median dynamics process in general graphs. In this model, each vertex has an independent initial opinion uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1] and, with rate one, updates its opinion to coincide with the median of its…

We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the smoothed satisfaction of voting axioms, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the smoothed social choice framework, where an…

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…

A celebrated argument of F. Hartogs (1915) deduces the Axiom of Choice from the hypothesis of comparability for any pair of cardinals. We show how each of a sequence of seemingly much weaker hypotheses suffices. Fixing a finite number…

Explaining autonomous and intelligent systems is critical in order to improve trust in their decisions. Counterfactuals have emerged as one of the most compelling forms of explanation. They address ``why not'' questions by revealing how…

The aim of this note is to provide a conceptually simple demonstration of the fact that repetitive model sets are characterized as the repetitive Meyer sets with an almost automorphic associated dynamical system.