相关论文: Self-consistency of voting implies majority vote

We define a family of runoff rules that work as follows: voters cast approval ballots over candidates; two finalists are selected; and the winner is decided by majority. With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the…

We develop a comprehensive theory of the stable representation categories of several sequences of groups, including the classical and symmetric groups, and their relation to the unstable categories. An important component of this theory is…

We introduce and prove the consistency of a new set theoretic axiom we call the \emph{Invariant Ideal Axiom}. The axiom enables us to provide (consistently) a full topological classification of countable sequential groups, as well as fully…

In 1977, Young proposed a voting scheme that extends the Condorcet Principle based on the fewest possible number of voters whose removal yields a Condorcet winner. We prove that both the winner and the ranking problem for Young elections is…

In a single winner election with several candidates and ranked choice or rating scale ballots, a Condorcet winner is one who wins all their two way races by majority rule or MR. A voting system has Condorcet consistency or CC if it names…

We consider an urn model with multiple drawing and random time-dependent addition matrix. The model is very general with respect to previous literature: the number of sampled balls at each time-step is random, the addition matrix has…

Justification theory is an abstract unifying formalism that captures semantics of various non-monotonic logics. One intriguing problem that has received significant attention is the consistency problem: under which conditions are…

We say that an idempotent term $t$ is an exact-$m$-majority term if $t$ evaluates to $a$, whenever the element $a$ occurs exactly $m$ times in the arguments of $t$, and all the other arguments are equal. If $m<n$ and some variety $\mathcal…

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In \cite{McL11}, McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider…

We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be computed in polynomial time as…

There has been much recent work on multiwinner voting systems. However, sometimes a committee is highly structured, and if we want to vote for such a committee, our voting method should be more structured as well. We consider committees…

We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the…

We explore the relation between two natural symmetry properties of voting rules. The first is transitive-symmetry -- the property of invariance to a transitive permutation group -- while the second is the "unbiased" property of every voter…

The theory of random matrices contains many central limit theorems. We have central limit theorems for eigenvalues statistics, for the log-determinant and log-permanent, for limiting distribution of individual eigenvalues in the bulk, and…

This paper will develop a single framework for unifying, simplifying and extending our prior results about axiom systems that retain a partial knowledge of their own consistency, via an axiomatic declaration of self-consistency. Its perhaps…

To understand and summarize approval preferences and other binary evaluation data, it is useful to order the items on an axis which explains the data. In a political election using approval voting, this could be an ideological left-right…

We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…

The paper surveys more than forty characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation and contains one new result. A general scoring operator is {\it self-consistent} if alternative $i$ is assigned a greater score than $j$…

The goal of this paper is to propose and study properties of multiwinner voting rules which can be consider as generalisations of single-winner scoring voting rules. We consider SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, and several variants of…

The Naming Game is a classic model for studying the emergence and evolution of language within a population. In this paper, we extend the traditional Naming Game model to encompass multiple committed opinions and investigate the system…