相关论文: Self-consistency of voting implies majority vote

An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of extracting a ranking of the alternatives from a pairwise comparison ratio matrix. The ordering induced by row geometric mean method is proved to be uniquely determined by three independent…

We study consensus processes on the complete graph of $n$ nodes. Initially, each node supports one from up to n opinions. Nodes randomly and in parallel sample the opinions of constant many nodes. Based on these samples, they use an update…

In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…

We show that the quantum description of measurement based on decoherence fixes the bug in quantum theory discussed in [D. Frauchiger and R. Renner, {\em Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself}, Nat. Comm. {\bf 9},…

The consistency formula for set theory can be stated in terms of the free-variables theory of primitive recursive maps. Free-variable p. r. predicates are decidable by set theory, main result here, built on recursive evaluation of p. r. map…

We show that various aspects of k-automatic sequences -- such as having an unbordered factor of length n -- are both decidable and effectively enumerable. As a consequence it follows that many related sequences are either k-automatic or…

We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among…

Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…

As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in…

We design a recursive measure of voting power based on partial as well as full voting efficacy. Classical measures, by contrast, incorporate solely full efficacy. We motivate our design by representing voting games using a division lattice…

The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…

Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…

The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…

Quality assurance remains a key topic in human computation research. Prior work indicates that majority voting is effective for low difficulty tasks, but has limitations for harder tasks. This paper explores two methods of addressing this…

We investigate a variation of the classical voter model in which the set of influencing agents depends on an individual's current opinion. The initial population consists of a random sample of equally sized sub-populations for each state,…

Pisot sequences (sequences $a_n$ with initial terms $a_0=x, a_1=y$, and defined for $n>1$ by $a_n= \lfloor a_{n-1}^2/a_{n-2} + \frac{1}{2} \rfloor$) often satisfy linear recurrences with constant coefficients that are valid for all $n \geq…

We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…

There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility…

It is shown that a natural notion of congruence permutability for quasivarieties already implies ``being a variety''. The result follows immediately from [3] and the sole aim of this note is to state it explicitly, together with a…

Consider a social-choice function (SCF) is chosen to decide votes in a formal system, including votes to replace the voting method itself. Agents vote according to their ex-ante belief over what decisions are considered, and whether they…