相关论文: How good are Popular Matchings?
Popularity is an approach in mechanism design to find fair structures in a graph, based on the votes of the nodes. Popular matchings are the relaxation of stable matchings: given a graph G=(V,E) with strict preferences on the neighbors of…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and the maximum number of…
We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects --…
We re-visit the global - relative to control policies - stability of multiclass queueing networks. In these, as is known, it is generally insufficient that the nominal utilization at each server is below 100%. Certain policies, although…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
In this paper, we construct and compare algorithmic approaches to solve the Preference Consistency Problem for preference statements based on hierarchical models. Instances of this problem contain a set of preference statements that are…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
We introduce a new and broader formulation of the stable marriage problem (SMP), called the stable polygamy problem (SPP), where multiple individuals from a larger group $L$ of $|L|$ individuals can be matched with a single individual from…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), which involves the assignment of students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and…
It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
To understand the empirical success of approximate MAP inference, recent work (Lang et al., 2018) has shown that some popular approximation algorithms perform very well when the input instance is stable. The simplest stability condition…
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom when one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, monetary transfers are not…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…