相关论文: One simple remark concerning the uniform value

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…

For a game with positive expectation and some negative profit, a unique price exists, at which the optimal proportion of investment reaches its maximum. For a game with parallel translated profit, the ratio of this price to its expectation…

We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…

We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

In a probabilistic mean field game driven by a L\'evy process an individual player aims to minimize a long run discounted/ergodic cost by controlling the process through a pair of increasing and decreasing c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…

Decentralized team problems where players have asymmetric information about the state of the underlying stochastic system have been actively studied, but \emph{games} between such teams are less understood. We consider a general model of…

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…

We examine perfect information stochastic mean-payoff games - a class of games containing as special sub-classes the usual mean-payoff games and parity games. We show that deterministic memoryless strategies that are optimal for discounted…

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…

Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…

In \emph{zero-sum two-player hidden stochastic games}, players observe partial information about the state. We address: $(i)$ the existence of the \emph{uniform value}, i.e., a limiting average payoff that both players can guarantee for…

Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) and Mertens and Neyman (1981) have proved, respectively, the existence of the asymptotic value and the uniform value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action sets. In their work, the…

We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…

This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…