相关论文: One simple remark concerning the uniform value

We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to "seed" the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. The payoffs to the firms are the eventual number of…

We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak…

We describe an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to compute approximations of the optimal strategies and of the minimal losses that can be guaranteed in discounted repeated games with vector-valued losses. Such games…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…

We give a self-contained and elementary proof for boundedness, existence, and uniqueness of solutions to dynamic programming principles (DPP) for biased tug-of-war games with running costs. The domain we work in is very general, and as a…

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…

This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…

We address an optimal stopping problem over the set of Bermudan-type strategies $\Theta$ (which we understand in a more general sense than the stopping strategies for Bermudan options in finance) and with non-linear operators (non-linear…

We introduce novel multi-agent interaction models of entropic spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary undisclosed games and their quasi-static limits. These evolutions vastly generalize first and second order dynamics. Besides the…

The dollar game is a chip-firing game introduced by Baker and Norine (2007) as a context in which to formulate and prove the Riemann-Roch theorem for graphs. A divisor on a graph is a formal integer sum of vertices. Each determines a dollar…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number of rounds). The game is adversarially chosen from some…

This paper introduces a systematic methodological framework to design and analyze distributed algorithms for optimization and games over networks. Starting from a centralized method, we identify an aggregation function involving all the…

Potential game is an emerging notion and framework for studying N-player games, especially with heterogeneous players. In this paper, we build an analytical framework for dynamic potential games. We prove that a game is a dynamic potential…

Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for…