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In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…
Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
This paper is based on the complete classification of evolutionary scenarios for the Moran process with two strategies given by Taylor et al. (B. Math. Biol. 66(6): 1621--1644, 2004). Their classification is based on whether each strategy…
With $\{\xi_i\}_{i\ge 0}$ being a centered stationary Gaussian sequence with non-negative correlation function $\rho(i):=\mathbb{E}[ \xi_0\xi_i]$ and $\{\sigma(i)\}_{i\ge 1}$ a sequence of positive reals, we study the asymptotics of the…
We have studied the persistence probability $p(t)$ of an active Brownian particle with shape asymmetry in two dimensions. The persistence probability is defined as the the probability of a stochastic variable that has not changed it's sign…
In this paper we show that the continuum time version of the Minority Game satisfies the criteria for the application of a theorem on the existence of an invariant measure. We consider the special case of a game with "sufficiently"…
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables. Using the replicator-mutator equations, we…
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for {\Sigma} 2 , the second level of the…
We consider a simple model for multidimensional cone-wise linear dynamics around cusp-like equilibria. We assume that the local linear evolution is either $\mathbf{v}^\prime=\mathbb{A}\mathbf{v}$ or $\mathbb{B}\mathbf{v}$ (with…
The limiting stability of invariant probability measures of time homogeneous transition semigroups for autonomous stochastic systems has been extensively discussed in the literature. In this paper we initially initiate a program to study…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…
Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross' learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations. However, not all of…
To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…