Evolutionary game theory and population dynamics
摘要
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts of evolutionary game theory and review basic properties of deterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite populations. We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with migration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and spatial games with local interactions. We analyze the dependence of the long-run behaviour of a population on various parameters such as the time delay, the noise level, and the size of the population.
引用
@article{arxiv.q-bio/0703062,
title = {Evolutionary game theory and population dynamics},
author = {Jacek Miekisz},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:q-bio/0703062},
year = {2013}
}
备注
51 pages, Lecture notes of the course given in the CIME and Banach Center Summer School "From a Microscopic to a Macroscopic Description of Complex Systems", Bedlewo, Poland, 4-9 September 2006