相关论文: Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogene…
The concept of distance rationalizability of social choice rules has been explored in recent years by several authors. We deal here with several foundational questions, and unify, correct, and generalize previous work. For example, we study…
The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize")…
This paper is concerned with the probability of consensus in a multivariate, spatially explicit version of the Hegselmann-Krause model for the dynamics of opinions. Individuals are located on the vertices of a finite connected graph…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
We consider a classical problem in choice theory -- vote aggregation -- using novel distance measures between permutations that arise in several practical applications. The distance measures are derived through an axiomatic approach, taking…
We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invariant to renaming the candidates and voters, and two elections…
We study a family of distance functions on rankings that allow for asymmetric treatments of alternatives and consider the distinct relevance of the top and bottom positions for ordered lists. We provide a full axiomatic characterization of…
We introduce the notion of {\em Distance Restricted Manipulation}, where colluding manipulator(s) need to compute if there exist votes which make their preferred alternative win the election when their knowledge about the others' votes is a…
There is a class of models for pol/mil/econ bargaining and conflict that is loosely based on the Median Voter Theorem which has been used with great success for about 30 years. However, there are fundamental mathematical limitations to…
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…
We present a unifying framework encompassing many social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we consider a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which---similarly to the…
This work addresses arbitrary convex vector optimization problems, which constitute a general framework for multi-criteria decision-making in diverse real-world applications. Due to their complexity, such problems are typically tackled…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
This work proposes an algorithm to bound the minimum distance between points on trajectories of a dynamical system and points on an unsafe set. Prior work on certifying safety of trajectories includes barrier and density methods, which do…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
Increasingly, critical decisions in public policy, governance, and business strategy rely on a deeper understanding of the needs and opinions of constituent members (e.g. citizens, shareholders). While it has become easier to collect a…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
In representative democracy, a redistricting map is chosen to partition an electorate into districts which each elects a representative. A valid redistricting map must satisfy a collection of constraints such as being compact, contiguous,…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…