相关论文: An Analysis of the Replicator Dynamics for an Asym…
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…
The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are…
The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…
We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between…
In this paper, we propose a method for solving a PPAD-complete problem [Papadimitriou, 1994]. Given is the payoff matrix $C$ of a symmetric bimatrix game $(C, C^T)$ and our goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium of $(C, C^T)$. In this paper,…
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…
In this paper we characterise the long-run behaviour of the replicator dynamic in zero-sum games (symmetric or non-symmetric). Specifically, we prove that every zero-sum game possesses a unique global replicator attractor, which we then…
We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads…
Replicator equation -- a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics -- mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the…
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…
S. J. van Enk and R. Pike in PRA 66, 024306 (2002) argue that the equilibrium solution to a quantum game isn't unique but is already present in the classical game itself. In this work, we contest this assertion by showing that a random…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…
We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the…
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor work "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorithmic details on how to…
We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…