相关论文: On the Single-Valuedness of the Pre-Kernel

Recently, Maggiorano et al. (2025) claimed that they have developed a strongly polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm for the nucleolus in convex games that is based on the reduced game approach and submodular function minimization method.…

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…

We establish a generalized Perron-Frobenius theorem, based on a combinatorial criterion which entails the existence of an eigenvector for any nonlinear order-preserving and positively homogeneous map $f$ acting on the open orthant…

We establish some new common fixed point theorems of single-valued and multivalued mappings operating between complete ordered locally convex spaces under weaker assumptions. As an application, we prove a new minimax theorem of existence of…

The core of a game $v$ on $N$, which is the set of additive games $\phi$ dominating $v$ such that $\phi(N)=v(N)$, is a central notion in cooperative game theory, decision making and in combinatorics, where it is related to submodular…

This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours…

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…

We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…

We study the classical and quantum values of one- and two-party linear games, an important class of unique games that generalizes the well-known XOR games to the case of non-binary outcomes. We introduce a ``constraint graph" associated to…

We consider one-round games between a classical verifier and two provers who share entanglement. We show that when the constraints enforced by the verifier are `unique' constraints (i.e., permutations), the value of the game can be well…

Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work on this front, it was conjectured that the attractors of the replicator…

Zero-sum mean payoff games can be studied by means of a nonlinear spectral problem. When the state space is finite, the latter consists in finding an eigenpair $(u,\lambda)$ solution of $T(u)=\lambda \mathbf{1} + u$ where $T:\mathbb{R}^n…

We introduce a simple transformation on two-player nonlocal games, called "anchoring", and prove an exponential-decay parallel repetition theorem for all anchored games in the setting of quantum entangled players. This transformation is…

We study the properties of the core and other solution concepts of Bel coalitional games, that generalize classical coalitional games by introducing uncertainty in the framework. In this uncertain environment, we work with contracts, that…

We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…

We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…

Cooperative games with nonempty core are called balanced, and the set of balanced games is a polyhedron. Given a game with empty core, we look for the closest balanced game, in the sense of the (weighted) Euclidean distance, i.e., the…

We present a general technique, based on a primal-dual formulation, for analyzing the quality of self-emerging solutions in weighted congestion games. With respect to traditional combinatorial approaches, the primal-dual schema has at least…

We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the…