相关论文: The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations a…

We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…

We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…

This paper investigates the game theory of resource-allocation situations where the "first come, first serve" heuristic creates inequitable, asymmetric benefits to the players. Specifically, this problem is formulated as a Generalized Nash…

The maximization of Nash welfare, which equals the geometric mean of agents' utilities, is widely studied because it balances efficiency and fairness in resource allocation problems. Banerjee, Gkatzelis, Gorokh, and Jin (2022) recently…

We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…

We propose a toy model for a stochastic description of the competition between two athletes of unequal strength, whose average strength difference is represented by a parameter $d$. The athletes interact through the choice of their…

Demand response has been a promising solution for accommodating renewable energy in power systems. In this study, we consider a demand response scheme within a distribution network facing an energy supply deficit. The utility company…

This work addresses learning online fair division under uncertainty, where a central planner sequentially allocates items without precise knowledge of agents' values or utilities. Departing from conventional online algorithm, the planner…

We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…

We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff…

Traditional methods for computing equilibria in auctions become computationally intractable as auction complexity increases, particularly in multi-item and dynamic auctions. This paper introduces a self-play based reinforcement learning…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations, such equilibria,…

We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private…

In this paper, we propose an asynchronous distributed algorithm for the computation of generalized Nash equilibria in noncooperative games, where the players interact via an undirected communication graph. Specifically, we extend the paper…

In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…

In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…