相关论文: Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain

Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy…

We characterize the class of group-strategyproof mechanisms for the single facility location game in any unconstrained strictly convex space. A mechanism is \emph{group-strategyproof}, if no group of agents can misreport so that all its…

We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…

We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…

In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…

We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that there is no single…

We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…

A dominating set in a graph $G$ is a set $S$ of vertices of $G$ such that every vertex outside $S$ is adjacent to a vertex in $S$. A connected dominating set in $G$ is a dominating set $S$ such that the subgraph $G[S]$ induced by $S$ is…

We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…

We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…

A set $S$ of vertices of a graph $G$ is a dominating set in $G$ if every vertex outside of $S$ is adjacent to at least one vertex belonging to $S$. A domination parameter of $G$ is related to those sets of vertices of a graph satisfying…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…

The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…

Imagine that we are given a set $D$ of officials and a set $W$ of civils. For each civil $x \in W$, there must be an official $v \in D$ that can serve $x$, and whenever any such $v$ is serving $x$, there must also be another civil $w \in W$…

Suppose that G is a finite group and x in G has prime order p > 3. Then x is contained in the solvable radical of G if (and only if) <x,x^g> is solvable for all g in G. If G is an almost simple group and x in G has prime order p > 3 then…

We prove the following result: If $G$ be a connected graph on $n \ge 6$ vertices, then there exists a set of vertices $D$ with $|D| \le \frac{n}{3}$ and such that $V(G) \setminus N[D]$ is an independent set, where $N[D]$ is the closed…

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…

Let $G$ be a graph. A dominating set $D\subseteq V(G)$ is a super dominating set if for every vertex $x\in V(G) \setminus D$ there exists $y\in D$ such that $N_G(y)\cap (V(G)\setminus D)) = \{x\}$. The cardinality of a smallest super…