相关论文: Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this…
The $1/2$-conjecture on the domination game asserts that if $G$ is a traceable graph, then the game domination number $\gamma_g(G)$ of $G$ is at most $\left\lceil \frac{n(G)}{2} \right\rceil$. A traceable graph is a $1/2$-graph if…
Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…
Let $\gamma_g(G)$ be the game domination number of a graph $G$. It is proved that if ${\rm diam}(G) = 2$, then $\gamma_g(G) \le \left\lceil \frac{n(G)}{2} \right\rceil- \left\lfloor \frac{n(G)}{11}\right\rfloor$. The bound is attained: if…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
We consider a setting in which agents are allocated land plots and they have additive preferences over which plot they get and who their neighbor is. Strategyproofness, Pareto optimality, and individual rationality are three fundamental…
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever…
Let $G=(V,E)$ be a graph. A subset $D$ of $V(G)$ is called a super dominating set if for every $v \in V(G)-D$ there exists an external private neighbour of $v$ with respect to $V(G)-D.$ The minimum cardinality of a super dominating set is…
Given a Markov decision process (MDP) $M$ and a formula $\Phi$, the strategy synthesis problem asks if there exists a strategy $\sigma$ s.t. the resulting Markov chain $M[\sigma]$ satisfies $\Phi$. This problem is known to be undecidable…
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it…
This paper derives two stabilizability theorems for a basic class of discrete-time nonlinear systems with multiple unknown parameters. First, we claim that a discrete-time multi-parameter system is stabilizable if its nonlinear growth rate…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
In any graph $G$, the domination number $\gamma(G)$ is at most the independence number $\alpha(G)$. The Inverse Domination Conjecture says that, in any isolate-free $G$, there exists pair of vertex-disjoint dominating sets $D, D'$ with…
The game theoretic concepts of rationalizability and iterated dominance are closely related and provide characterizations of each other. Indeed, the equivalence between them implies that in a two player finite game, the remaining set of…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
A set $S$ of vertices in a graph $G$ is a paired dominating set if every vertex of $G$ is adjacent to a vertex in $S$ and the subgraph induced by $S$ admits a perfect matching. The minimum cardinality of a paired dominating set of $G$ is…
This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…