Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability
Theoretical Economics
2023-10-10 v1
Abstract
This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this equivalence assuming the domain satisfies a richness condition. However, the result cannot be extended to the many-to-one matching markets. We further consider a setting with single-peaked preferences and characterize all domains compatible for stability and (group) strategy-proofness.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.05252,
title = {Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability},
author = {Pinaki Mandal},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.05252},
year = {2023}
}