Approximate Strategyproofness in Large, Two-Sided Matching Markets
Multiagent Systems
2022-11-30 v2
Abstract
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there seems to be a strong connection between the length of preference order lists, the correlation of agent preferences, and the approximation of strategyproofness. Interestingly, approximate strategyproofness is reached easier with a shorter length of preference orders and higher preference correlation. These findings justify the use of the deferred acceptance algorithm in large two-sided matching markets despite it not being strategy-proof.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1912.04800,
title = {Approximate Strategyproofness in Large, Two-Sided Matching Markets},
author = {Lars Lien Ankile and Kjartan Krange and Yuto Yagi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.04800},
year = {2022}
}